The comparative Sino-Soviet history became a vibrant field.
not be removed fast, and this defined the pace the Sino-Soviet normalization. It is quite remarkable, however, how patiently and steadily both sides had been moving to bring to closure the period of mutual hostility. The record shows that the ghosts from the past, including bitter historical memories, cultural differences, and mutual prejudices played surprisingly little role in the story of the normalization.
Last but not least, this article dwells upon limitations of the Sino-Soviet normalization. From the start, these limitations were defined by the Chinese course of modernization. Ultimately, the reformist aspirations in both countries pulled them towards the US-led global capitalist system, not towards each other.
Normalization within geopolitical realities
In March 1982, Leonid Brezhnev addressed China in his "Tashkent speech" with an appeal for reconciliation. The ailing Soviet leader expressed readiness to leave behind ideological quarrel and begin to talk about territorial issues. It was not an accidental probe. Moscow began to send feelers to Beijing soon after the death of Mao Zedong in September 1976, but the power struggle in China, Sino-Soviet conflict over Cambodia, and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan put the Sino-Soviet contacts on hold. In early 4 1982 a good moment came up: Deng Xiaoping used Rumanian leader Nicolae Ceausescu as an intermediary to signal his readiness for moving beyond status quo. 10 The leading Soviet sinologists, intellectuals and diplomats, believed that the factors of geopolitics, Chinese nationalism, and bitter memories of the recent past would persist and define China's hostility towards the Soviet Union. Oleg Rakhmanin, the main authority on China in the CC CPSU Department for liaisons with socialist countries, tirelessly touted this argument. Leading Soviet experts on China, Mikhail S. Kapitsa, Mikhail I. Sladkovskii, and Sergei L. Tikhvinskii, were in Rakhmanin's camp. 11 On the contrary, Brezhnev's foreign policy assistant Andrei M. Aleksandrov-Agentov, believed that restoration of Sino-Soviet relations was possible for both pragmatic and ideological reasons. He was one of the last survivors from the Comintern days, and witnessed closely the entire story of the Sino-Soviet alliance. Brezhnev fully trusted Alexandrov-Agentov, consulted him regularly, and met with him at least three times in January-March 1982. In his memoirs, Alexandrov-Agentov recalls that it was his initiative to insert "China theme" into the speech Brezhnev was going to deliver in Tashkent. The speech stated:
"We did not deny and do not deny the presence of socialist order in China." The text continued: "We remember well those times, when the Soviet Union and people's China were united by the ties of friendship and comradely cooperation. We never considered the state of hostility and alienation between our countries a normal phenomenon."
12
The Politburo approved Aleksandrov-Agentov's initiative. Apparently the most powerful skeptics of Sino-Soviet normalization, among them Andrei Gromyko, Yuri Andropov, and Dmitry Ustinov, did not dare this time to stand in opposition. Leonid
Brezhnev was disillusioned by the quagmire situation in Afghanistan, that this "troika" The available evidence, however, does not support such definitive conclusions.
The revisionist interpretations sometimes conflate Gorbachev's rhetoric, his monologues in the Politburo, with the actual policy-making. Also, the literature often exaggerates the policy impact of academic think-tanks and academic Institutchiki (intellectuals with political ties). 27 In 1986 Gorbachev's approach to Asia was ideological and vague, not realist and specific. In his close circle, during the discussion of his programmatic speech opened with Gorbachev's proposal of a nuclear-free world by the year 2000, and closed
by his sensational summit with Ronald Reagan in Reykjavik, focused on the same idea.
Still, his hallmark remained "grand vision" speeches and soliloquies, and he preferred to specific policy decisions a process of "shopping" in the marketplace of political ideas.
Most of those ideas remained on paper and did not translate into consistent policies. The Chinese leaders firmly rejected any offers for a rapprochement against the Abalkin's deputy P. Katsura and a group of Soviet economists travelled to China and came back with the conclusion that the dual economy, with its state-planned and market segments, generated a considerable growth of export, accumulation of currency reserves, and economic growth. The conclusions of the experts, however, overlooked the fundamentals of China's reforms: rigid state controls and the clean division between "two economies," state-run and private ones. Instead, Abalkin experts recommended exactly the opposite approach, the combination of "mixed economy" and decentralization. everything." The Soviet Union, he continued, have everything that China lacks:
fertilizers, equipment, intensive methods in agriculture. The problem was how "to link personal interests with socialism," the problem "that preoccupied [Lenin], and we should think and think about it." Gorbachev even put in doubt that the Chinese reforms successfully filled the shelves in the shops, and insisted that people could not afford to buy those goods at commercial prices. This was, as one scholar comments, "at best a nonsensical exaggeration". The Soviet leader, however, did not want to divert from the set goal: he needed another geopolitical success, not meddling in a student revolution. 68 In the literature, the summit is often described as "only a handshake, but no scholarship: after all, China proved it was impossible to reform the "totalitarian" communist system and embed it into the capitalist world. At the same time, the Soviet case also begs for a fresh approach: both those who had hailed Gorbachev's political liberalization as the best road to reform the Soviet Union, and those who believed that the Soviet system was beyond reform are proven wrong. In reality, the Soviet leadership unwittingly put the country on the road of rapid economic self-destruction and financial 31 destabilization. The only way to restore that stability was by authoritarian policies to restore economic stability. Instead, Gorbachev decided to avoid his own "Tiananman"
and turn on political liberalization. After that, the eroding Soviet economy and the Soviet Union itself could no longer be saved; they could only collapse.
